Protection or provocation? Police control of Muslim immigrants in combating terrorism by Alexander, Rachel





Protection or Provocation?  









Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
 of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
 






















POLICE CONTROL OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS   1
Abstract 
Counter-terrorism efforts have considerable bearing on the relationship between Muslim 
immigrants and law enforcement. As frontline law enforcers, the police are responsible for 
securing community support and acting as first responders to criminal activity. Following 
September 11, many laws have aggressively targeted Muslim immigrants under the belief they 
pose the largest security threat. Such outcomes threaten to increase targeted police responses, 
traditional police approaches, marginalization, legal and human rights violations and decrease 
preventive measures, community policing, and ultimately erode police legitimacy. This paper 
explores current counter-terrorist efforts and how such responses display spillover effects that 
impact all Muslims. It is argued that, in some instances, these responses are counterproductive 
and increase the likelihood of terrorist activity. An assessment of more fruitful policing strategies 
will be provided.  
 Keywords: counter-terrorism policing, community policing, Muslim immigrants, 










POLICE CONTROL OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS   2
Introduction 
In a time when counter-terrorism policing strategies are becoming a higher priority, 
police services have reverted to traditional tough on crime approaches (Poynting & Mason, 2006; 
Tyler, 2012). Some governments view punitive and discriminatory approaches, which target 
Muslim immigrant populations, as the only way to protect citizens from future attacks (Bush, 
2001; Kirk, Papachristos, Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Poynting & Mason, 2006). However, these 
strategies often tarnish relationships between the police and Muslim immigrants, which enflames 
tension and increases distrust from nationals in their countries of origin (Cole, 2002). Following 
September 11 (9/11), a precarious political climate emerged, which has marginalized Muslim 
communities. Dominant counter-terrorism policing approaches elicit many undesired and 
harmful outcomes, which breed alienation, attenuate police legitimacy, and violate legal and 
human rights. Fortunately, there is some promise in alternative community-based approaches as 
they avoid these harmful consequences and address terrorism more effectively. This paper argues 
that police responses have direct bearing on their relationship with Muslim communities, which, 
in turn, can either prevent or instigate future incidents.   
This paper begins by broadly exploring the concept of transnational terrorism and 
providing a brief overview of the punitive climate of restriction and discrimination within the 
context of the War on Terror (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004; Townshend, 2011; White, 2012). This 
is followed by a discussion on Islamophobia and the scapegoating of all Muslims as perpetrators 
of terrorism. Moreover, an overview of the contours, hazards, and consequences of current 
models of counter-terrorist policing is offered. Before offering a brief conclusion, the benefits of 
a cooperative, consensual, and community-focused approach are provided. 
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This research addresses issues that are often overlooked in counter-terrorism scholarship. 
Many nations have framed aggressive policing efforts as necessary and desirable; however, it is 
equally important to consider their deeper impacts and consequences (Jonathan-Zamir, Weisburd 
& Hasisi, 2014). There is a lack of consensus on effective counter-terrorism policing and 
confusion surrounding the role of police officers (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Lum, Haberfeld, 
Fachner & Lieberman, 2009; McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 2007). Although there is no 
definitive solution, this research details how police officers can engage with Muslim populations 
and thereby mitigate the potential hazards of current approaches.  
Furthermore, by applying the core dimensions of community policing, it is possible that 
the relationship between Muslim populations and law enforcement may be rectified and 
strengthened (Grabosky, 2008; Mastrofski, 2006; Skogan & Steiner, 2004; Skogan, 2006; 
Weisburd et al., 2009). The application of a community policing approach may prevent terrorist 
activity, eliminate the harmful effects of system avoidance, and remove feelings of 
discrimination, alienation, and marginalization (Brayne, 2014; Stuart, Armenta & Osborne, 
2015). This research enhances the existing body of counter-terrorism policing literature by 
exploring the feasibility of community policing approaches and the relationship between police 
personnel and Muslim populations. 
Terrorism 
Terrorism does not have a clear-cut definition; the only consensus regarding the concept 
is its elusiveness (Ganor, 2009). Any understanding of terrorism must include three components: 
(1) the use of force, (2) the targeting of innocent people, and (3) political motivations (White, 
2012). Accordingly, this paper approaches terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence aimed 
against civilians…to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, 
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etc.)” (Ganor, 2009, p. 21). Following this definition, the overriding goal of terrorism is to instill 
fear by altering public perceptions through extreme violence (Innes, 2006; Townshend, 2011). 
There are two modes of terrorist violence: symbolic and signal. The symbolic mode of 
terrorism occurs when violence is “directed toward a symbol of the social and cultural order to 
which the perpetrator is opposed” (Innes, 2006, p. 223). For instance, the 9/11 terrorist attack on 
the Pentagon would be categorized as a symbolic mode of terrorism since the Pentagon is a 
symbol of the United States’ military power (Turk, 2004; Welch, 2006). The signal mode of 
terrorism demonstrates to the public that there is a risk and threat that they should be aware of, 
which usually takes place in public places where many civilians are likely to be injured or killed 
(Aas, 2007; Innes, 2006).  
Terrorist organizations often attempt to cause polarization among all members of society, 
which causes the public to pressure decision-makers, and ultimately make changes that will 
benefit the interests and goals of terrorist organizations (Deflem, 2010; Walsh, 2016). 
Paradoxically, extreme government responses are often precisely what terrorist organizations 
desire (Ganor, 2009; Walsh, 2016). Terrorists revel in the fact that, to fight against terrorism, it is 
necessary to renounce many democratic and liberal values, as terrorism is inherently anti-
democratic (Ganor, 2009; Townshend, 2011). The nature of terrorism places Western nations in 
a precarious position, as inaction will lead to public disapproval; yet, responses also satisfy 
terrorists to some degree (Jonathan-Zamir, Weisburd & Hasisi, 2014; Smelser, 2007). When 
terrorist incidents occur, it becomes difficult to re-establish a strong sense of security, which 
causes the population to become suspicious of others from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Fassin, 2011; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; 
Satzewich, 1989; Spencer, 2008). 
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Post-9/11 political climate: War on Terror and the securitization of migration 
Migrants of different ethnonational and religious origins have historically faced 
considerable discrimination and suspicion specifically in the US and UK (Fassin, 2011; Fox & 
Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Satzewich, 1989; Shon, 2011; 
Spencer, 2008; Stuart et al., 2008; Stumpf, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Van der Leun, 2006). The threat 
of transnational terrorism has reignited such trends in many Western countries with Arab and 
Muslim populations as they are viewed as posing the greatest security risk (Poynting & Mason, 
2006; Spencer, 2008; Taylor, 2002; Waiton, 2009). The terrorist attacks that occurred in the past 
two decades have given rise to punitive sanctions and justification for warfare, while also 
providing law enforcement personnel with a new scapegoat to target (Kappeler & Kappeler 
2004; Poynting & Mason, 2006; Welch, 2006). Fearmongering schemes and exaggeration of the 
imminent threat of terrorism were used to ignite the War on Terror and justify many policing and 
security measures that would have been excessive prior to 9/11 (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004). 
The War on Terror was waged under the guise of self-defence; however, it has increasingly 
become more offensive over the past decade (Townshend, 2011). 
Many changes in Western immigration policies occurred after 9/11, which were guided 
by a criminal justice agenda and part of the reason for widespread moral panics concerning 
migrants of different ethnonational and religious origins (Bibler Coutin, 2005; Eck, 2006; Fassin, 
2011; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Walsh, 2016). The terrorist suspect became viewed as the 
most extreme threat and danger to all individuals (Bosworth & Guild, 2008). The recurring 
theme among immigration policies is the need to control, secure and remove undesirable 
immigrant populations. Contemporary federal immigration powers facilitate discriminatory 
practices by the government and law enforcement, which essentially demonize entire populations 
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(Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008; Taylor, 2002). These responses have institutionalized a 
“culture of control” and escalated punitive responses to crime (Garland, 2001, p.139).  
Former President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Combating 
Terrorism through Immigration Policies one month after 9/11, which proves that the fight 
against terrorism is contingent on immigration measures (Bush, 2001; Spencer, 2008). During 
this time, 762 immigrants and foreigners in the US were detained as potential suspects and 
charged for violating immigration law rather than criminal law (Bibler Coutin, 2005). In turn, the 
number of US deportations more than doubled from 165,000 in 2002 to 400,000 in 2009 (Kirk et 
al., 2012)1. The criminalization of immigrants is currently enabled by legislation such as the 
Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (the 
Sensenbrenner Bill), which deemed illegal immigration a felony, rather than a civil offense 
(Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010).  
An additional set of laws were devised to explicitly link terrorism to immigration. 
Sections 411 to 418 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) empower law 
enforcement officials to detain non-citizens without having a hearing and without proving that 
the individual in question poses a security risk (Spencer, 2008; Taylor, 2002; Waiton, 2009). The 
United Kingdom also enacted similar legislation with the passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA) (Spencer, 2008). The ATCSA empowered the Home 
Secretary to detain foreign individuals without trial and denied access to asylum if they are 
suspected terrorists (Bibler Coutin, 2005; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Spencer, 2008). The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was also incorporated into the Department of 
                                                
1 Of the 400,000 deportations in 2009, 67% were non-criminal immigrants. 
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Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003; subsequently, thousands of Arab and Muslim immigrants 
were arrested and detained (Spencer, 2008).  
Furthermore, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) also 
requires foreign nationals from 25 predominantly Muslim states to register with the DHS and 
notify the INS of any changes in home residence, employment, or school (Leiken & Brooke, 
2006; Spencer, 2008). The US and UK have notably increased intrusive forms of information 
collection at the border with the recent inclusion of biometric information from certain 
immigrants (Stuart et al., 2015). With this turn to “crimmigration”, Muslim and Arab immigrant 
status is stigmatized (Stumpf, 2006). The War on Terror changes perceptions of the immigration 
issue by reframing immigration and Muslims as a security issue, which contributes to public 
acceptance of broader punitive approaches (Poynting & Mason, 2006). The implementation of 
stricter immigration policies and controls is viewed as an “important tool in the ‘war on 
terrorism’” (Spencer, 2008, p. 2). Unfortunately, this causes further systemic issues for all 
Muslim and Arab immigrants, which have unintended effects and place Western nations in a 
greater state of precarity. 
Scapegoating and Islamophobia 
Considering the policies outlined above it is evident that Muslims are the main 
scapegoats of terrorism (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Welch, 2006). Scapegoating refers to the 
displacement of blame onto innocent populations that are already subject to discrimination due to 
their race, ethnicity, or religion (Welch, 2006). While a fraction of the world’s Muslim 
population is responsible for terrorism, all Muslims are treated as categorically suspect. The 
notion of perpetual suspicion is reproduced through Islamophobia, which refers to “a fear or 
hatred of Islam and its adherents that translates into individual, ideological and systemic forms of 
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oppression and discrimination” (Hanniman, 2008, p. 273). The anti-Muslim reaction following 
9/11 was marked by fear and avoidance of Muslim immigrants, which led to the marginalization 
of the entire Muslim population in Western nations (Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Hanniman, 2008). 
Islamophobia has produced discriminatory forms of political, social, economic and military 
control. Islamophobic rhetoric sustains inequality as it pertains to the main systems of power 
(Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Welch, 2006). Consequently, the security agenda in Western 
democracies has become known as the Securitization of Islam (SOI), which is defined as “a 
process that is constructed around a perceived Islamist threat and the promotion of actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Fox & Akbaba, 2015, p. 175; Murphy, 2007). 
The SOI expands many police powers and invokes harsher sanctions concerning potential threats 
associated with Muslim immigration (Cesari, 2009). The SOI reinforces the unique position of 
Muslims as perpetual suspects and victims (Cesari, 2009; Murphy, 2007). 
As such, Hanniman (2008) states that Muslims have three distinct fears: “fears of being 
victims of terrorism themselves, fears of backlash/hate crimes towards their communities if there 
is a terrorist incident, and the fear of being the innocent victim of an anti-terrorism measure” (p. 
278). When a population is viewed as a threat, it becomes easier to convince the public that there 
is a need for harsher sanctions, but, there is little regard for those who are affected by these 
sanctions. Many Muslim immigrants claim they are disrespected in ways that range from being 
asked inappropriate cultural questions to property damage in the form of bigoted graffiti, verbal 
harassment, physical assaults, and homicide (Hanniman, 2008; Welch, 2006). In Canada, the 
Toronto Police Service reported a 66% increase in hate crimes post-9/11, and 37% of all hate 
crimes were directed against Muslims (Hanniman, 2008). In many Western nations, the sight of 
difference is viewed as a sign of failed integration (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). The veil, for 
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instance, is a physical symbol of “a ‘threat’ to British values” (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012, p. 
270). Similarly, men who have beards, wear shalwar kameez (traditional clothing), or engage in 
prayer in the street during Muslim festivals are often targeted and viewed with suspicion (Tufail 
& Poynting, 2013). Muslims have become an easy target for scapegoating, public scrutiny, and 
police racial profiling due to their perceived failed integration (Hanniman, 2008; Jamil, 2014; 
Poynting & Mason, 2006; Welch, 2006).  
The media also propagates the image of all Muslims as monsters, savages, pedophiles, 
evil, and extremely violent (Awan & Zempi, 2015; Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012). The media is a 
prominent source of anti-Islamic rhetoric since it disseminates fearmongering messages to 
millions of people (Ameli & Berali, 2014). Media outlets often follow international events that 
portray Muslims as evil and extremely violent to attempt to control the views of citizens in 
nations where these events are not taking place, which directly impacts their views on Muslims 
in their country (Awan & Zempi, 2015). 
Elected officials in many Western nations have also contributed to the scapegoating of 
Muslims by targeting entire Islamic populations (Poynting & Mason, 2008). Some politicians 
have candidly stated that it is necessary to enter mosques and schools to ensure that there is no 
promotion of terrorism, which fosters an environment that allows discrimination and harassment 
of Muslims (Poynting & Mason, 2008). Increased surveillance, harassment, and mistrust 
facilitate radicalization and justify Muslim claims of the West vs. Islam dichotomy (English, 
2009; Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, 2010; Walsh, 2016). Under these circumstances, it is important 
to consider the effects of scapegoating and Islamophobia as they potentially incite terrorism. 
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The consequences: Frustration, aggression, radicalization 
Alienation increases the likelihood of radicalization since there is a strong link between 
feelings of otherness and terrorism. Many terrorists have expressed “feelings of alienation, 
powerlessness and shame and an urge for revenge”, which often stem from perceived procedural 
injustice due to discriminatory immigration laws and policing strategies (Fischer, Harb, Al Sarraf 
& Nashabe, 2008; Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008, p. 11; Tyler et al., 2010). 
Frustration/aggression theory provides a preliminary framework to explain why someone might 
resort to terrorism. The key tenets of frustration/aggression theory posit that a buildup of tension 
within an in-group often results in aggression towards an out-group (Welch, 2006). For example, 
the political and social backlash that Muslim immigrants have experienced has been a great 
source of anger, frustration, and contempt (Pew Research Center, 2006; USIP, 2010).  
Many Muslim individuals have felt that they have no other choice but to retaliate (Pew 
Research Center, 2006; Welch, 2006). The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) completed a 
qualitative study of 2,032 individuals who chose to leave their country of origin to fight for al-
Qaeda in the US and, unsurprisingly, approximately 30% of these individuals became terrorists 
because they were seeking revenge. This suggests that their motivation is fuelled by frustration 
with the treatment from society in addition to the conflating effects of discriminatory 
immigration policies, racial profiling, and ultimately, over-policing (Ameli & Berali, 2014; 
Jamil, 2014; Poynting & Mason, 2006; USIP, 2010). USIP explicitly states that there is a need to 
ensure that approaches to counter-terrorism are sensitive to the factors driving terrorism to avoid 
further marginalization and alienation of individuals at risk (USIP, 2010). In this regard, police 
services have attempted to develop new approaches to respond to terrorism. 
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Dominant police responses to terrorism 
The confluence of political messages, the media, and public hostility paves the path for a 
misguided sense of risk and insecurity, which has resulted in a “disproportion between risk and 
response”, which is reflected in the dominant ways that police services respond to terrorism 
(Brodeur, 2010, p. 39; Innes, 2006). In many Western democracies, the role of police is to serve 
rather than dominate, and police are encouraged to view the public as clients and partners 
(Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Grabosky, 2008; Townshend, 2011; Tyler, 2012). However, when 
9/11 unfolded, there was a great shift in policing as terrorism raised an unparalleled set of 
problems that were seemingly incompatible with the innovations of the decade before. There was 
a shift from community policing to counter-terrorism policing approaches, which invoked 
responses that distanced the police from the community (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Jonathan-
Zamir et al., 2014). 
 To many law enforcement officials, the foundation of counter-terrorism is surveillance 
and control (Brayne, 2014; Grabosky, 2008; Thacher, 2005). This ideology is evidenced in the 
recent changes to police information collection, increased technological surveillance devices, and 
an increasingly overt police presence in public places populated by suspect populations (Lum et 
al., 2009; Innes, 2006). Much like immigration policies, police use surveillance and control as 
tools to ensure that certain populations are restricted, which extends the concept of “the enemy 
within” (Hasisi, Alpert & Flynn, 2009, p.178). Israel and the UK, for instance, have been 
struggling to balance counter-terrorism and conventional policing for many decades and the main 
challenges are centred upon the conflicting nature of traditional, authoritative policing and 
contemporary, community policing (Grabosky, 2008; Weisburd et al., 2009). To this end, 
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examples of preventive and reactive responses that specifically impact Muslim populations will 
be outlined. 
Preventive responses. One of the notable responses to terrorism is the shift from low 
policing to high policing (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Brodeur, 2010). High policing (often 
synonymized with counter-terrorism policing) involves a shift in focus towards macro crimes, 
which are crimes that are viewed as more of a threat to society (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009). 
More specifically, Lum et al. (2009) have thematically classified seven overarching counter-
terrorist police responses. The prominent approaches that contribute to targeted police responses 
and the marginalization of Muslims will briefly be discussed. Some of the most problematic 
preventive responses are increases in general deterrence, surveillance, and monitoring, which 
requires police officers to “target vulnerable [and suspect] populations” (Lum et al., 2009, p. 
110; Innes, 2006). These responses also include the prospective offender stop and search, which 
involves identifying and surveilling those who may be at risk or are suspected of being involved 
in terrorism (Innes, 2006). These responses require police officers to limit access to places for 
certain individuals, conduct “random searches”, rely on closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
footage, and increase police presence in all areas (Lum et al., 2009, p. 110). These efforts often 
lead to the targeting of Muslim populations (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015).  
Intelligence-led policing. Additional preventive responses to terrorism include changes 
in strategic planning, which involve new risk assessment measures, predictive formulas and 
enhanced information collection and analysis (Lum et al., 2009). Relatedly, many Western 
nations have considered the value in adopting an intelligence-led policing (ILP) model as a 
preventive measure to gather information on potential terrorist threats (McGarrell et al., 2007; 
Simeone, 2008; White, 2012). ILP builds on the framework of community and problem solving 
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policing and places an emphasis on the targeting and identification of high rate and chronic 
offenders (McGarrell et al., 2007). ILP also differs in that it takes a centralized approach and 
serves an intelligence function rather than a decentralized approach that serves a community 
relations function (Simeone, 2008). Intelligence-led initiatives reveal pertinent information on 
planned terrorist incidents when the correct individuals are identified and questioned, which has 
been used to penetrate and break some of the most difficult terrorist cells (McGarrell et al., 2007; 
White, 2012). ILP is also beneficial when implemented from an all-crimes approach, since street-
level crimes are sometimes found to be linked to the funding of terrorism activities for terrorist 
groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda (McGarrell et al., 2007; Simeone, 2008). 
Although all ILP initiatives are not directly related to terrorism, ILP uncovers information on 
criminal activity that may be linked to terrorist activity (McGarrell et al., 2007). Moreover, ILP 
relies on technology that goes beyond face-to-face interaction to gather information and prevent 
crimes (Mastrofski, 2006; Simeone, 2008).  
Militarization of police. An additional counter-terrorism response is the implementation 
of new technologies, which include surveillance, communication, rescue technologies, and the 
increase in tactical police apparatuses that resemble combat apparatuses (i.e. the militarization of 
police) (Mastrofski, 2006; White, 2012). The magnitude of terrorism causes police services to 
band together and it may be tempting to militarize police responses (White, 2012). The 
militarization of police becomes apparent when police tactical units are called to deal with 
hostage situations and gunmen (White, 2012). Officers within these tactical units are equipped 
with military-grade weapons and often use military commands (White, 2012). Murray (2005) 
argues that police are resorting to traditional aggressive policing methods and roles, which 
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constructs the dependence on a paramilitary structure and inherently requires the police to 
distance themselves from the public.  
Reactive responses. There are three identified reactive responses to terrorism, which 
include: accommodation, criminalization, and suppression (Guelke, 2006). The first reactive 
response, accommodation, involves treating individuals involved, or suspected to be involved, in 
a lenient manner. This legitimizes the terrorists’ cause and acknowledges their message, which is 
what terrorists are often seeking (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Guelke, 2006). 
For instance, one of the main messages of terrorist organizations is that democratic states are 
hypocritical since they pride themselves on freedom, fairness, and justice and terrorists do not 
believe that these liberties are delivered equally (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; 
Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 2008; Townshend, 2011). When the police respond in a 
punitive way, they are administering perceived injustice, which fuels further terrorism, as it 
confirms the belief that democratic states are hypocritical (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 
2008; Townshend, 2011). To counteract this effect, police officers treat terrorists leniently to 
suggest that democracy is exercised (Guelke, 2006).  
The second reactive response, criminalization, refers to terrorists being treated the same 
as street criminals; however, this response disregards terrorists’ cause and may result in recurrent 
acts of terrorism for the root cause to be acknowledged (Ganor, 2009; Innes, 2006; Townshend, 
2011). The third and final reactive response, suppression, is the most severe form of treatment 
where terrorists are punished more severely than any other form of criminal (Guelke, 2006). 
Suppression ultimately confirms and validates terrorists’ cause as it reveals the repressive nature 
of the government or country under target (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Guelke, 2006). Suppression is 
illustrated in the targeted police efforts towards radical extremists, which often validates 
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terrorists as a form of provocation and evidence to suggest that democratic states are the real 
problem (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015).  
Of the three responses noted above, there is no confirmation as to which is most 
effective; however, the most commonly used responses to terror in Western democracies are a 
combination of suppression and criminalization (Guelke, 2006; Townshend, 2011). The 
elusiveness of the effects of police responses is an important understanding since the terrorists’ 
reactions to these responses are very significant in terms of future terrorist incidents (Kirk et al., 
2012; Poynting & Mason, 2006). With an unfounded understanding of their effects, it is difficult 
to improve future counter-terrorist policing models (Innes, 2006). It is undeniable that The War 
on Terror is being fought by many government bodies and there is very little contention that the 
police should be involved; however, the role of police remains unclear and responses to terrorism 
are inconclusive at best (Townshend, 2011; Tyler, 2012). 
Hazards of counter-terrorist policing approaches 
Unfortunately, current counter-terrorist policing approaches pose many hazards and 
negative consequences. At the most direct level, the shift to high policing causes communities to 
become neglected, which decreases relationship-building opportunities (Cherney & Murphy, 
2013; Hasisi et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). Moreover, the police spend more time 
guarding at-risk spaces in response to prospective threats and less time responding to other 
criminal activity (Hasisi et al., 2009). High policing is also difficult to control and the nature of 
terrorist threats may also provide police officers with a false sense of righteousness to violate the 
law in terms of intelligence gathering and prosecutions (Hasisi et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et 
al., 2014). The precarity of the new role of police officers involved in counter-terrorism 
ultimately leads police to revert to traditional models of policing that were utilized before the 
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community policing era (Hanniman, 2008). Furthermore, high policing leads to a decrease in 
community crime prevention funding and an increase in homeland security resources (Jonathan-
Zamir et al., 2014). However, the effects of counter-terrorist policing go beyond the obvious 
tangible and fiscal drawbacks. 
Perpetuation of avoidance, frustration, aggression, and radicalization. Many of the 
noted preventive counter-terrorist policing approaches are the source of resentment, anger, and 
frustration expressed by Muslims as an extension of the consequences of scapegoating and 
Islamophobia (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Spalek, 2011). Counter-terrorist policing often 
increases levels of legal cynicism among Muslim immigrants and the “belief that the law and the 
agents of its enforcement…are illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill-equipped to provide equitable 
and adequate public safety” (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Kirk et al., 2012; Stuart et al., 2015, p. 
244). When a population experiences poor integration measures and discrimination they may 
engage in system avoidance (Brayne, 2014; Stuart et al., 2015; Van der Leun, 2006). 
Furthermore, when police legitimacy is called into question, people are less inclined to cooperate 
with the police (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Tyler et al., 2010).  
Additionally, individuals who have experienced similar unfair measures in their country 
of origin are shown to be more avoidant of police officers and reluctant to engage in 
communication that may assist the police (Cole, 2002). Overly punitive laws are not always seen 
as legitimate by individuals because they do not seem fair or justified. When individuals view 
laws as morally just, they are more likely to abide by the law (Kirk et al., 2012). Punitiveness has 
become rooted in Western culture and many populations continue to believe it is the most 
effective way to deal with “serious anxiety-ridden problem[s]” (i.e. crime in general) (Garland, 
1996, p. 460). Counter-terrorism policing also extends the culture of fear and control, which 
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causes Muslim populations to fear contact with legal and government institutions (Bosworth & 
Guild, 2008; Garland, 2001; Stuart et al., 2015). Minority groups are often afraid to approach the 
police as they are aware that they are viewed as the enemy within and they will often face 
oppressive measures that reinforce this discrimination (Garland, 2001; Hasisi et al., 2009). 
System avoidance can also be extended to hospitals, schools, and public places, which can 
potentially lead to higher poverty, morbidity, and mortality rates, all of which, affect societies at 
large (Stuart et al., 2015). 
Cole (2002) notes that when Muslims are targeted based on their ethnic origin and 
religion, nationals also become antagonistic in their homeland. Lack of cooperation from the 
countries that house terrorist and extremist ideologies will only beget more terrorism in Western 
democracies (Cole, 2002; Spencer, 2008). When Western governments act in ways that overtly 
support counter-terrorist policies, al Qaeda supporters and other terrorist groups become more 
aggravated because it reinforces the West vs. Islam dichotomy (Spencer, 2008). The obvious and 
longstanding demand to remove Muslim immigrants from France, for instance, is arguably part 
of the reason for the ongoing increase in terrorist incidents in this country (Guiraudon & Joppke, 
2001; World Atlas, 2015). Racial and religious profiling is inherent in counter-terrorism 
policing, which places an enormous strain on the relationship between the whole Muslim 
population and law enforcement and ultimately reflects government values (Tyler, 2012). When 
disenfranchised individuals are suspected of terrorism this also aggravates the whole Muslim 
population (Spencer, 2008). Furthermore, it is arguable that labelling crimes involving Muslims, 
as terrorism, instead of criminal activity, allows law enforcement officials to advance the anti-
Muslim agenda while also challenging long-established laws, rules, and norms (Murphy, 2007; 
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Turk, 2004). If the label of terrorism is applied, the amount of harm, violence, and persecution of 
Muslim immigrant populations may be excused (Turk, 2004).  
Current policing approaches also cause latent responses from the greater populace, which 
breeds alienation and arguably contributes to increases in terrorism (Fassin, 2011; Fox & 
Akbaba, 2015; Hanniman, 2008). The treatment of entire populations as threats or folk devils 
only increases the tensions and divisions between populations, which is what terrorists seek 
(Morgan & Poynting, 2012). The whole response to terrorism essentially becomes 
counterproductive as it is arguably predicated on targeting Muslims. Addressing terrorism as 
“Islamic terrorism” causes the whole population to suffer and many Muslims may feel hostile 
towards non-Muslim citizens who hold these views (Pickering et al., 2008, p. 117). To put these 
views into perspective and understand the extent and scope of issues that have arose, it is 
important to consider the countries that are ranked highest on the Global Terrorism Index2. 
Israel, the UK, the US, France and Ireland are among the highest ranked Western democracies 
(World Atlas, 2015). The number of terrorist incidents reflect the relationship between Muslims 
and all members of society, to some degree, since research suggests that those who experience 
strained relationships with their countries of residence are more likely to engage in terrorism 
(Hanniman, 2008; Innes, 2006). 
As an extension, second-generation Muslim immigrants also experience varying forms of 
discrimination and marginalization, which has led many individuals to identify more with their 
Muslim identity than that of the Western nation they were born in (Fassin, 2011; Murphy, 2007; 
Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Tufail and Poynting (2013) reveal that all second-generation Muslim 
immigrants in their study express that, despite living their whole lives in the UK, their nationality 
                                                
2 The Global Terrorism Index ranking system is determined based on the number of terrorist 
incidents within each country. 
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and belonging is still questioned and often denied. Additionally, second-generation Muslim 
immigrants frequently experience unwarranted traffic stops and accusations of engaging in 
terrorist activity from the police (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Cultural exclusion and targeting may 
cause second-generation immigrants to become further immersed in extremist interpretations of 
Islam and feel increased resentment towards the nation they live in (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014).  
Counterproductive nature of police responses. In terms of ILP measures, specifically, 
they reveal a unique set of issues as intelligence is currently gathered in ineffective and 
counterproductive ways (Townshend, 2011). For instance, some Internet-based intelligence 
gathering tools include email, web portals, and web forums; however, this can become 
problematic as it also leads to issues regarding information sharing and surveillance of all 
civilians (Simeone, 2008). Many civilians are very reluctant to share information with the police, 
especially minority immigrant populations, because of the distrust between the police and these 
populations (Hasisi et al., 2009; Simeone, 2008). However, when information is voluntarily 
provided, the quality of information received is questionable as most civilians are not well 
informed on terrorist/terrorist activity identification (Hasisi et al., 2009). The poor quality of 
information is due to reasons such as ignorance and unawareness of new terrorism methods, 
which are more sophisticated and unlikely to be viewed with suspicion by civilians (Hasisi et al., 
2009). Unfortunately, this results in the police relying on false reports of terrorist activity, which 
they are still required to investigate. Not only does this waste time and resources, but it also 
places potentially innocent individuals under suspicion and creates greater levels of distrust. 
Trust between communities and the police is imperative to the functioning of both 
entities (Armenta, 2016; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006). Without mutual trust, it is 
challenging for police personnel to gain the intelligence necessary to combat issues such as 
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terrorism, which places individuals in a state of precarious victimization (Grabosky, 2008). 
Unfortunately, “the intersection of counter-terrorism and policing may serve to erode community 
confidence in policing, particularly in communities with a concentration of religious minorities” 
(Grabosky, 2008, p. 4). As many researchers suggest, targeting of individuals has very 
detrimental effects on populations since innocent individuals are often unwarrantedly targeted as 
well (Ameli & Berali, 2014; Awan & Zempi, 2015; Hanniman, 2008). Proactive measures of this 
nature also involve the gathering of information that has no relation to criminal activity and if it 
is insufficiently monitored, this can lead to the misuse of information (White, 2012). Finally, the 
government’s thirst for intelligence can also lead to the dissolution of legal constraints, increased 
police powers (abuse of power), increase in detention without trial, and in the worst case, the use 
of torture tactics (Townshend, 2011). 
When considering the hazards of counter-terrorism policing, it becomes apparent that the 
alienation of Muslims and the counterproductive nature of current approaches can potentially 
lead to further terrorism. Police have become so occupied with catching suspects that they are 
neglecting their role of helping clients, which erodes the relations between police and diverse 
communities (Grabosky, 2008). An unclear understanding of police roles in “prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery” aspects of counter-terrorism can also lead to police 
inefficacy (Pickering et al., 2008, p. 97). Many governments fail to recognize that preventive 
measures are of equal, if not greater, importance in combating terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 
2013; Medaris, 2007; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2011; Sorrell, 2011; Spalek, 2010). The 
European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 contains four strands of counter-terrorism 
measures, which include prevention, pursuit, protection, and response (Sorell, 2011). Yet, the 
only strands that explicitly pertain to the police are pursuit and protection. These two strands 
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require securing borders against terrorists, as well as the arrest and prosecution of those 
encountered (Sorell, 2011). This causes many frontline officers to view counter-terrorism as an 
issue beyond the scope of their position and as something that is handled better by specialist 
units (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Thacher, 2005). Despite the best efforts of officers in counter-
terrorism policing, it will prove ineffective without a concerted effort to engage with the 
community and establish partnerships (Hasisi et al., 2009).  
The promise of community policing 
Community policing presents an alternative counter-terrorism strategy as building 
relationships with communities of ethnic and religious diversity is imperative alongside counter-
terrorism policing approaches (Pickering et al., 2008). Police officers are the closest to diverse 
populations due to their work in the field; it is important to understand officers’ role in 
preventing and responding to terrorist activity. The police are the best-equipped law enforcers in 
society because they can build relationships with community members that express their support 
of radical ideologies by providing shelter and financial assistance for terrorists (Skogan, 2006; 
Tyler, 2012). It is arguable that counter-terrorism policing and community policing are 
incompatible; however, the purpose of this section is to highlight how community policing 
approaches have been and can be incorporated to strengthen relationships with Muslim 
communities, and ultimately prevent terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Feucht, Weisburd, 
Perry, Felson Mock & Hakimi, 2009; Grabosky, 2008; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Kirk et al., 
2012; Murray, 2005).  
As Tyler et al. (2010) note, research has failed to consider the most suitable policing 
strategies to rectify and decrease terrorism. However, some scholars suggest that it would be 
beneficial to attempt to shape the behaviour of community members that may be supportive of 
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radical ideologies (Grabosky, 2008; Skogan, 2006; Tyler et al., 2010; Tyler, 2012). If the police 
can enter these communities, they may be able to sever the source of support for radical 
ideologies (Skogan, 2006; Tyler, 2012). Community policing is not defined by a standardized set 
of programs, but instead, it is viewed as an organizational strategy that creates changes in police 
culture and decision making (Skogan & Steiner, 2004; Skogan, 2006). Community policing has 
three fundamental elements, which include “citizen involvement, problem solving, and 
decentralization” (Weisburd & Braga, 2006, p. 28). Through communication and engagement 
with community members, police officers establish a strong rapport with communities and stay 
informed, which also discourages police officers from adopting the pre-existing “we versus they” 
stance towards citizens (Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000, p. 581; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). The 
success of community policing is contingent on police-public partnerships and police response to 
citizen input (Skogan, 2006). Moreover, police officers are encouraged to lead community 
efforts by endorsing involvement in neighbourhood watches and citizen patrols, which is 
important in the context of counter-terrorism (Skogan, 2006; Walsh, 2014). For example, many 
US states have prioritized citizen watch programs to reduce criminal activity (Walsh, 2014).  
Community policing is viewed as a fundamental preventive counter-terrorism measure 
(Grabosky, 2008; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006; Spalek, 
2010); yet, as some studies have noted, reactive measures continue to take precedence over 
prevention in current counter-terrorism policing approaches (Pickering et al., 2008; Sorell, 
2011). Alternatively, community policing encourages officers to be proactive and focus on 
relationship-building practices (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Guelke, 2006; Medaris, 2007; Townshend, 
2011). The purpose of community policing is not to increase suspicion or stop and search 
powers, but instead, to build connections and trust with the population (Armenta, 2016; 
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Pickering et al., 2008; Skogan, 2006). Traditional policing requires officers to speed to crime 
scenes or terrorist attacks and complete paperwork after an incident and, in many cases, the 
devastation and damage is irreparable (Grabosky, 2008). Furthermore, community policing can 
enhance the current intelligence gathering process since better relations increase flows of 
information to authorities (Hasisi et al., 2009). Achieving these positive and ideal outcomes is 
clearly challenging (Cherney & Murphy, 2013); however, community policing initiatives in 
Israel, the US, and the UK serve as exemplary models in this developing field (Hasisi, et al., 
2009; Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014; Lum et al., 2009; Medaris, 2007; Spalek, 2010; White, 2012). 
Israeli police as educators and Civil Guard recruiters. The Israeli police realize that it 
is necessary to have a community presence to build connections with the community (Jonathan-
Zamir et al., 2014). They have expanded their role as educators by entering schools and public 
spaces to educate the civilian population on how to detect terrorist activity (Hasisi, et al., 2009; 
Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). The Israeli police encourage children and adults to report any 
suspicious objects or people, which gives all individuals the confidence that their claims are 
taken seriously and their safety is valued. Furthermore, they encourage all Israeli citizens, 
regardless of their religion, to join the Civil Guard and directly assist in police work and counter-
terrorism efforts. Civil Guard volunteers are given powers that range from being armed with 
weapons to making arrests (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2014). These efforts are an attempt to repair 
the relationship between the police and minority populations, encourage frequent interaction with 
communities, enhance civilian awareness of terrorist activity, and ensure higher rates of 
reporting to decrease terrorist incidents (Deflem, 2010; Hasisi, et al., 2009; Jonathan-Zamir et 
al., 2014).  
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Communities Against Terrorism. The US also has a community policing program in 
place called Communities Against Terrorism (CAT). The purpose of CAT is also to foster 
community partnerships, with a specific focus on spreading awareness to local business owners 
whose stores may be frequented by terrorists (Medaris, 2007; White, 2012). This is an important 
preventive measure as terrorists often purchase items from local stores in preparation for terrorist 
attacks. For instance, landscaping and farm supply stores are given information about potential 
explosives that may be purchased to flag potential terrorists and contact local authorities in a pre-
emptive attempt to stop the individual from carrying out the attack (Medaris, 2007; White, 
2012). Although all neighbourhoods are not equally at risk, it is important to spread awareness to 
all jurisdictions as terrorists often purchase supplies from areas that are distant from the attack 
site (Medaris, 2007). Moreover, the main goal of CAT is to “shift local law enforcement from 
‘first responders’ to ‘first preventers,’” alert and inform all citizens, which also enhances 
information sharing capabilities (Medaris, 2007, p. 71). 
Muslim Contact Unit. Finally, the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) serves as an example of 
the structure and functioning of a specialist unit designated for Muslim communities. The MCU 
is modelled after current community policing units and it has been incorporated in the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London (Lum et al., 2009). The unit was established in 
2002 and they have been involved in many collaborative initiatives with the Muslim Safety 
Forum. The MCU illustrates a radical shift from traditional counter-terrorism policing which has 
placed national security agendas before the concerns of communities (Murphy 2007). In 2008, 
the MCU merged with the Counter Terrorism Command as part of the community engagement 
team.  
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The MCU was created to improve counter-terrorism efforts by specifically engaging with 
Muslim communities and establishing a new “policing by consent order” (Spalek, 2010, p. 193). 
The MCU’s mission is to build connections and work with local Muslim community leaders and 
Muslim youth as partners, rather than informants (Spalek, 2010). To enhance this function, some 
police within this unit are Muslim; however, as Black and Kari (2010) note, diversity within 
police agencies does not always elicit intended effects, as minority groups continue to express 
very low levels of confidence and satisfaction with police services. This suggests that other 
measures are necessary to enhance relationships between the police and Muslim populations. In a 
similar vein, the MCU is kept at an arm’s length during police raids in Muslim communities to 
prevent any negative sentiment towards the police officers in the unit as an attempt to establish 
and maintain a positive relationship (Spalek, 2010). Following police raids, the MCU has a 
noticeable presence in affected communities to reduce tensions and explain the actions of the 
police officers involved in the raid (Lum et al., 2009).  
The success of a police unit comparable to the MCU is based on trust. Without trust, 
there are reduced opportunities to engage with Muslim communities and obtain useful 
intelligence. It is important to avoid “partnership models that exploit trust for intelligence … 
[and create] true partnerships [instead]” (Innes, 2006; Spalek, 2010, p. 679). This is one of the 
main distinctions of the MCU, as the unit is predicated on establishing a relationship centred on 
trust, whereas other policing initiatives have failed (Spalek, 2010). There is a need to explore 
alternative ways of trust building before creating a community policing model alongside counter-
terrorism initiatives. Current community policing programs that solely seek to enter communities 
to gather intelligence often alienate the population and cause greater hostility (Hanniman, 2008); 
therefore, police engagement must go beyond information sharing. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This research has found that there is a lack of appropriate proactive and reactive police 
counter-terrorism responses, as many of these responses target Muslim populations. There is 
room to develop both proactive and reactive counter-terrorism approaches by engaging in 
community initiatives, which is identified as one of the key factors to consider in counter-
terrorism approaches. Although the direct effects of police engaging in counter-terrorism 
education, Civil Guard recruitment, CAT, and the MCU are inconclusive, it is arguable that the 
three models and approaches bear merit when considering ways to rectify deficiencies in the 
current counter-terrorism policing infrastructure. These models and approaches reveal the 
importance of relationship-building with at-risk communities to foster an environment of trust, 
inclusion, and positive interactions.  
Community policing alone, cannot eradicate terrorism; however, the same can be said 
about counter-terrorism policing. There is a need to incorporate community police and counter-
terrorism policing decision making processes into police actions and interactions with Muslim 
populations. It is imperative to consider the effects of obtrusive, targeted, and policing 
approaches that are not founded on best practices, as they serve to tarnish relationships and 
counteract any progress made between the police and Muslim communities (Hanniman, 2008; 
McGarrell et al., 2007). The maintenance of a trusting relationship between communities that may 
be considered high-risk is imperative in risk-reduction; yet, traditional policing methods often 
destroy the element that they seek to strengthen (Grabosky, 2008). 
As previously noted, one of the fundamental goals of terrorists is to divide nations; yet 
ironically, some contemporary counter-terrorist police approaches do just that (Ganor, 2009; 
Innes, 2006; Townshend, 2011). However, if police services approach terrorism by bringing 
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individuals together and establishing trusting relationships with Muslim communities through 
openness and transparency, preventive counter-terrorism measures can possibly be improved 
(Spalek, 2010). This relationship can be developed in various ways, which include but are not 
limited to, attending community gatherings held in mosques, schools, and community centres, 
attending festivals to learn, and initiating positive interactions (without the intent of gathering 
intelligence) to get to know community members.  
Police responses to terrorism can potentially have very adverse effects on Muslim 
immigrants (Cole, 2002; Hanniman, 2008; Innes, 2006; Lum et al., 2009; McGarrell et al., 2007). 
Migrant populations have faced differential treatment that infringes on their human rights, which 
was amplified following 9/11 as Muslim immigrant populations faced extreme levels of 
stigmatization, discrimination, and alienation. This treatment is arguably part of the reason for 
the continuation of terrorist acts almost two decades later (Fassin, 2011; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; 
Hanniman, 2008; Lawston & Escobar, 2009/2010; Murphy, 2007 Satzewich, 1989; Spencer, 
2008; Stuart et al., 2008; Stumpf, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Van der Leun, 2006; Walsh, 2016; Welch, 
2006). Western police services have taken many different approaches to combat terrorism; 
however, these approaches often reinforce traditional policing practices, which are sometimes 
overly aggressive, punitive, and discriminatory (Fagan & Tyler, 2012; Grabosky, 2008). The 
return to traditional policing practices has fuelled increased levels of cynicism towards police 
officers and all citizens in the countries where police services target Muslim immigrant 
populations (Stuart et al., 2015).  
The poor treatment, animosity, and scapegoating of Muslim immigrants has a significant 
impact on their inclination to engage in terrorist activity as a response to the perceived injustices 
they face due to counter-terrorist policing models. It is possible that continued efforts towards 
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community policing initiatives have the potential to repair relationships between Muslim 
populations and the police (Poynting & Mason, 2008). However, practices such as racial and 
religious profiling of Muslims as possible terrorists greatly inhibit the prospect of improving 
these relations (Hanniman, 2008). Racial and religious profiling leads to the continued 
stigmatization and discrimination against Muslims, which will cause them to engage in greater 
amounts of system avoidance, frustration, violence, and ultimately lead to the attenuation of 
democracy (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Brayne, 2014; Stuart et al., 2015; Van der Leun, 2006). 
The social problems that could result without a change in counter-terrorism policing are not 
limited to those suggested, as this issue creates endemic issues in society from a functionalist, 
political, human rights, and economic perspective. Ultimately, without a concerted effort to 
establish a trusting relationship between the police, Muslim immigrants, and society at large, it is 
difficult to foresee a decrease in the amount of terrorist incidents.  
Community policing initiatives have the prospect of uniting all communities while 
reducing levels of discrimination, strengthening partnerships between police and populations 
they serve, setting examples of peaceful endevours, and encouraging the joint effort in terrorism 
prevention. Some argue that the best response to terrorism is fearlessness; however, having no 
fear should not equate to inaction (Townshend, 2011). On the contrary, severe and punitive 
police responses are not more effective, as punitive responses often elicit negative results and 
further aggression towards the police and whole population. In turn, it seems apropos to respond 
in a way that is not guided by fear, absence of fear, or an extension of a punitive agenda, such as 
the War of Terror. Instead, responses should be delivered to convey confidence in the ability to 
repair communities and nations by uniting all populations; consequently, community-focused 
approaches would strengthen the ability of law enforcement to prevent and respond to terrorism. 
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